Doctrine for Counter Insurgency: The British Army's Experience

Colonel Alexander Alderson
Afghan COIN Centre

Counterinsurgency

“Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by the Government to defeat insurgency”

British Army Field Manual
Volume 1 Part 10
Countering Insurgency

ARMY

Army Code 71876
October 2009

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The Evolution of COIN

Doctrine







1950

1909 – *Field Service Regulations*

1934 – *Notes on Imperial Policing*

1949 - *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*

1957 and 1963 - *Keeping the Peace*

1966

1969 - *Counter-Revolutionary Operations Peace*

1972

1977 - *Counter-Revolutionary Operations*

2001

1995 - *Counter Insurgency Operations*

2009

Maj. Gen. Sir Charles Gwynn's *Imperial Policing*

1906 - Callwell's *Small Wars*

Palestine, Malaya

Malaya, Kenya, Borneo

Aden

NI, Oman

Control

Expansion

Field Service Regulations (1909)



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War Office
1665

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FIELD SERVICE REGULAT

PART I.

OPERATIONS

1909.

(*Reprinted, with Amendments*, 1912.)

GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE

ERRATUM.

Section 65, para. 11, line 7:—*Delete* from "When ap
the....." to end of paragraph and *substitute*:—
"When approaching the enemy unity of action
important; the force then usually moves on a narr
and a single advanced guard covering the whole force a
under the direct orders of the commander of the forc
required."

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CHAPTER X.

WARFARE AGAINST AN UNCIVILIZED ENEMY.*

141. *General principles.*

1. In campaigns against savages, the armament, tactics, and characteristics of the enemy, and the nature of the theatre of operations demand that the principles of regular warfare be somewhat modified; the modifications in this chapter are such as experience has shown to be necessary.

2. **Self-reliance, vigilance, and judgment** are the chief requisites for overcoming the difficulties inherent in savage warfare. Discipline and organization are powerful aids; but unless both officers and men are well trained, capable of adapting their action to unexpected conditions, and of beating the enemy at his own tactics the campaign will be needlessly long and costly.

3. The nature of the objective will differ considerably according to circumstances. In the case of peoples with some settled form of government, an advance against their capital will probably be opposed; its fall will follow the defeat of the enemy, and will bring all organized resistance to an end. Similarly, in dealing with independent fanatical tribes, an advance against a sacred town or shrine may have the same effect. If no such objective be available, the enemy may be brought to oppose the advance by a movement against his wells or sources of supply. Should the enemy refuse to make any organized resistance, the occupation of his country, the

1923 – Minimum Force?

Amritsar, India – April 13, 1919







Amritsar: the Change to Policy

“The principles which have consistently governed the policy of His Majesty’s Government are determined that [Minimum Force] shall remain, the primary factor of policy whenever circumstances unfortunately necessitate the suppression of civil disorder by military force within the British Empire.”

Gwynn: *Imperial Policing* (1934)

- Questions of policy remain vested in the civil Government
- The amount of military force employed must be the minimum the situation demands
- Take firm and timely action
- Co-operation: the task of restoring order does not rest on the Army alone

Inter-War Assumption: *Status quo ante?*

Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (1952)

"The Job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture CT in Malaya. This book shows in a clear and easily readable form the proven principles by which this can be done. This book is by no means perfect. Criticisms and improvements are invited by GOC Malaya, who will produce a revised edition in six months' time."



‘Warn the crowd by all available means that effective fire will be opened unless the crowd disperses at once. This can be done by a call on the bugle, followed by the display of banners showing the necessary warning in the vernacular.’

Land Operations Volume III, *Counter-Revolutionary Operations*, 1969, Part 2, p. 103



Sir Robert Thompson



- The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable
- Function in accordance with law
- The government must have an overall plan
- Give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas
- In the guerrilla phase, secure base areas first

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
Shape
Domestic and International Audiences
Host Country Security Forces
Local Population
Key Local Leaders
Host Country Government
Other Agencies
Detainees
Media
Develop
Host Nation Security Forces: train, mentor, monitor and embed
Support better governance
Support economic development
Restore essential services
Secure
Clear-Hold-Build
Find-Fix-Strike
Deter, Disrupt, Dislocate

Elements of Effective Security

- Security for the Population
- Presence
- Continuity
- Embedded Training Teams
- Intelligence
- ISTAR
- Influence
- Education

Primacy of Political Purpose

Unity of Effort

Understand the Human Terrain

Secure the Population

Neutralize the Insurgent

Gain and Maintain Popular Support


ARMY
The Aitken Report
An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse
and Unlawful Killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004
25 January 2008

Operate in accordanc
With the Law

Integrate Intelligence



Prepare for the Long Term

Learn and Adapt

Thompson *Defeating Communist Insurgency*	**Land Ops** ***Counter-Revolutionary Warfare***		**Land Ops** ***Counter-Revolutionary Warfare***		**Kitson** *Bunch of Five*	***Staff College Notes on Counter Insurgency***	**AFM Vol. 1 Pt. 10** ***Counter-Insurgency Operations***	**US Army FM 3-24** ***Historical Principles***	**AFM Vol. Part. 10 Proposed**
1966	1969		1977		1977	1994	2001	2006	2008
	General Principles of Government Action	**Operating Principles**	**Conduct of Security Force Operations**	**Planning**					
								Legitimacy Is the Main Objective	
The government must have a clear political aim			Political Awareness			Recognition of the Political Nature of the Problem and by Definition the Solution	Political Primacy and Political Aim	Political Factors Are Primary	Political Factors Have Primary
The government must have an overall plan	National Plan	Civil Authority							
	Co-ordinated Government Action	Co-operation	The moment of intervention – Police and Military Co-operation	Co-operation between Civil and Military authorities	Establish coordinated machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign	Civilian Dominated, Coordinated System of Command and Control	Coordinated Government Machinery	Unity of Effort Is Essential	Co-ordinated Government Action
		Minimum Force	Minimum Necessary Force						Minimum Necessary Force
Intelligence (Chapter 7)	Security Intelligence			Intelligence and Security	Set up an intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances	Information, Collated into Useable Intelligence	Intelligence and Information	Intelligence Drives Operations	Integration of Intelligence
								Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment	Develop and Maintain Understanding
In the guerrilla phase, secure base areas first						Neutralisation (including selective destruction) of Insurgents	Neutralising the Insurgent		Population Security
Give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas	Public Opinion and Popular Support Strong and Popular Security Forces		Popular Support		Ensure that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people	Separate the Insurgent from the People	Separating the Insurgent from his Support	Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support	Gain and Secure Popular Support
Function in accordance with law			The Law		Maintain a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment			Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential	Operate in Accordance with Law
						Development of Long-Term Government Reforms to Prevent a Resurgence of the Trouble	Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning	Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment	Plan for the Longer Term
				Training Research and Development	Education and Training (Chapter 9, *Low Intensity* Operations, 1972,)			[**Contemporary Imperative:** Learn and Adapt]	Learn and Adapt

CONCLUSIONS